Southeastern Equipment Co., A  Georgia Corporation And William Gochis, Intervenor v. James Mauss And Engleharde Mauss dba Jim\u27s Surplus And Storage : Brief of Respondent by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) 
1983 
Southeastern Equipment Co., A Georgia Corporation And William 
Gochis, Intervenor v. James Mauss And Engleharde Mauss dba 
Jim's Surplus And Storage : Brief of Respondent 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2 
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act, 
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Douglas F. White; Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Respondent, Southeastern Equipment Co. v. Mauss, No. 19041 (1983). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4584 
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTHEASTERN EQUIPMENT CO., a ) 
Georgia Corporation and WILLIA!! ) 
GO CHIS, Intervenor, ) 
Plaintiffs - Respondents, 
vs. 
JAMES MAUSS and ENGLEHARDE 
MAUSS dba JIM'S SURPLUS and 
STORAGE, 
Defendants - Appellants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. 19041 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
William Gochis 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third , ... --
District Court in and for Tooele Cotutt1. 
State of Utah, Honorable Scott Daniels, J\Mlge 
BARRIE A. VERNON 
275 South Main Street 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
DOUGLAS F. WHITE 
Prudential Plaza 
185 North ltain Street, Suite B-l 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants FILED 
JUL S • 1983 
--·-··-··----a.t. ...,_ eo.t, IW 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1 1 ( ·1.1t_·11 L t ii L111· l.cts e. 
0 ()'urn en t 
t'U 1 lff I. 
POl:lT 1 !. 
1-'0!IJT III. 
Conclusion . 
The Respondent Did Not Contract With 
The Appellant To Accept Only $20.00 Per 
!10nth In Payment On the $11 ,540.33 
Judgment Awarded To The Respondent. 
The Contract, If Any, Between The 
Parties ls Barred By The Statute Of 
Frauds .............. . 
The Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel 
ls Not Applicable To The Case At Bar. 
Certificate of Hand Delivery 
E,xhibit 
Exhibit 2 
Installment Promissory Note 
Judgment Entered In The Third Judicial 
District Court of Tooele County .... 
- i-
Page No. 
2 
4 
8 
10 
12 
14 
2 
3 
CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED 
c;ugar'10use Finance Co, v. Anc,erson, 610 P.2d 
1369 (1980). ..... 
baggs v. Anderson, Utah, 528 P.2d 141 (1974). 
Van Tassell v. Lewis, 118 Utah 356, 222 P.2d 
350 (1950) ...... . 
Guinand v. Walton, 22 Utah 2d 196, 450 P.2d 
467 (1969) 
Price v. Llovd, 31 Utah 86, C6 P.2d 767 
( 1960) · .•.•.. 
Jensen vs. Whitesides, 13 Utah 2d 193, 
370 P.2d 765 (1963). 
Dutton v. Interstate Investment Corporation, 
19 Cal. 2d 65, 199 P.2d 138 (1941) • 
Glitsos v. Kadish, 4 Arix. App. 134, 418 
P.2d 129 (1966) .......•... 
Statutes: 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 25-5-4 ( 1953) .••. 
::1 see l laneous: 
Contract Law by Charles Knapp .. 
,\;ipcllant' s In Support Of !lotion 
'T: j f' i I' h (' ..- i f ,j... I ;::: s ,j ) {'' , 
• ,tl 11L· 1. l.dt1 L ':, tir J. t.: 1 • 
) 1 ,,_, ,' 1 
- ii-
Page No. 
6' 7 
7 
7 
9 
9 
9 
10 
10' 11 
8' 12 
5 
5 
6 
9 
CASES AtlD AUTHORITIES CITED 
c,uy,Hilllus<e Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 
1)6C.l (19301......... . •.. 
fla,;gs v. Anderson, Ct an, 528 P .2d 141 ( 1974). 
Van Tassell v. Lewis, 118 Utah 356, 222 P. 2d 
350 (10501 
Guinand v. Walton, 22 Utah 2d 196, 450 P.2d 
467 ( 1969) 
Pric<e v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P.2d 767 
( l '!60) • . . . . • 
Jensen vs. 13 Utah 2d 193, 
370 P.2d 765 (1963). 
Dutton v. Interstate Investment Corooration, 
19 Cal. 2d 65, 199 P.2d 138 (1941) • 
Glitsos v. Kadish, 4 Arix. App. 134, 418 
P.2d 129 (1966) ...•.....•. 
Statutes: 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 25-5-4 (1953) •..• 
I:iscellaneous: 
Contract Law by Charles Knapp .. 
i\µpcl lant' s Ilemoranuu;:: ln Suµport Of !lotion 
- ii-
6, 7 
7 
7 
9 
9 
9 
10 
10' 11 
8' 12 
5 
0 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
111i,,\;)TERU IPt!ENT CO., a 
,,,gLi Corporation aud WILLIAM 
',,111:111 S, Intervenor, 
Plaintiffs - Respondents, 
vs. 
JAt!ES MAUSS and ENGLEllARDE 
dba JIM'S SURPLUS and 
STOK.ACE, 
Defendants - Appellants. 
CASE NO. 19041 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
William Cochis 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On January 31, 1983, a Sheriff's Sale was to be conducted 
in order to sell, at a public sale, the following described 
parcel of real property: 
Lot 3 of Block 135, Plat "A", Tooele City 
Survey, Tooele County. 
The Appellant, prior to the scheduled Sheriff's Sale, 
sought to stop the sale by submitting a Motion to Enjoin 
Sheriff's Sale. This Motion was heard on February 15, 1983. The 
Appellant contended, al the hearing, thal a contract e}{isted 
between the parties which limited the Respondent to collect only 
" '•_',J.0(J per month payment on the Judgment of $11,540.33, which 
-1-
was awarded to the Respondent un t1av L'. 1•-l/'i. 'l'l1t l\t' ,,M.l)J(l•·'.1' 
contended. at the h<';irirt)' I <,Ii•' 
The Respondent did df'.rL'<' that sJrtL'l' J,111u<11-v <>J Ii" Ii": 
receiving $20.00 per montli frcJm tl1v 11ppc·l l.n1t 
the judgment, out he did not enter intc• d cuntLtct 1<'llt1 u1" 
Appellant to b2 foreve1- bound to such dtl arr-.rngemcllt. 
The Court founJ thclr tht:>rl:.' WdS nu cont. rd ct !n:t1 .. .rvL'ri ltll' 
parties limiti:-ig the Respondent to 1-eccivin1: olllv $20.r)(I per 
month for payrn•cnt of the _iud;::ment and denied t_he i1pnclL1r.c'c 
injunction. The Appellant appeals from that ruling. 
STATEt1Et;T OF FACTS 
In 1974 James !lauss and his wife, Engleharde l:auss were 
owners and operators of the business known as Jir.1' s Surplus and 
Storage located in Tooele, Utah. During the operat1un of this 
business, the llauss' s borrowed money from >iilliam Gochis in 
order to further the business operation. 
On October 12, 1974 the llauss's, jointly and severally, 
borrowed $9,800.00 from William Cochis. This transaction is 
evidenced by the Installment Promissory !Jute executed by James 
Mauss and Engleharde llauss. See Exhibit 1. The Installment 
Promissory Note bore no interest and was tu bl' paid, i:: fd l. '" 
November 12, 1974. The note was not paid, nor anv portion of ir 
paid, on or before !Jovemher 12, 1974. 
As a result of the Appellants' deia1ilt. " lciwsu1: w"'' 
instituted; and on May 1::, 1975 the Court entered,, Jud;mtr' 
against the Appellants in favor ot th.- kespr>ndcnt. Tht· 'l r i ,,; 
-2-
1 <Jlfft awarded the Respondent the sum of $9 ,400 .00, plus 
:• 118.13 in attorney's fees, and $22.00 in court costs. See 
I , Ii l hit 2. 
After the Judgment and during the next five (5) years, the 
Appellants made no payments on the Judgment, and the Respondent 
made no attempts to collect or execute on the Judgment. In late 
1979 the Respondent made numerous contacts with the 
attorney in an attempt to get the Appellant to start paying 
"something" on the Judgment. 
In January of 1980, as a result of working through the 
Appellants' attorney, the Respondent started receiving $20.00 
per month as payment on the Judgment. The Appellant's attorney, 
also, told the Respondent that at some point the monthly 
payments would be increased, and the Judgment would be 
satisfied. The monthly payments have never been increased, and 
the Judgment remains unsatisfied. 
At the time Appellant started making the $20.00 per month 
payments, which was January of 1983, the Judgment, plus the 
accrued interest at the legal rate, was approximately 
$14,569.39. Interest was accruing at the legal rate of six 
pecrCET.t ( 6%) per annum or $69 .00 per month. 
The Respondent never agreed, in writing or orally, to only 
S20.00 per month as payment on the Judgment. The 
'<c"'fHindent never agreed, in writing or orally, to forgo or waive 
,,,, uf Lis legc1l remedies to collect on the Judgment and neither 
ciid he, imply the same at any time. 
-3-
Three (3) yedrs later, v.nen it iic:Ldrrrc: ·lf'I'·"' lit L"·' L 
Appellant was not going tu satistv the· T11J»111,·:H .11Jrl •'11!,, 
intended to make :;;2(),(l(l fJL'c rnunth p1·nn1·11l1; ''" 1 !11 l·rri"'"'' 111 
Respondent sought tu r1 rl)i...'t'l·d vli th LIH L'lll ll·,·t Illf1 111, 
through a Sheriff's Sdie. 
Respondent was limited to onlv receiving 32Cr.01J Per munth dS 
on the JGdgment. 
Motion To Enjoin Sheriff's Sale on the basis tha'. nu such 
contract ever existed between the parties. 
ARGUtlE!lT 
POINT I 
THE RESPOIWENT DID !JOT COtlTRACT WITH THE APPELLP.t:T 
TO ACCEPT OJ:LY $20 .00 PEP. 1;or;rn Ir; P . ;r':Tr:,-0-;--fff[-
s 11 , 540. 33 JUDGHEtlT AWARDED TO THE Rf:SR5T'.I'Effr:--
The Respondent adamantly denies the existence oi any 
contract with the Appellant to accept only $20.00 per month on d 
Judgment exceeding $11 ,000 .00. The Respondent oenies there w.is 
any offer, acceptance or consideration in order to consurnate ;i 
valid contract. 
Judgment with the intl·rH tu a "nd the: Rt-s 1»ndl'11'. 
. ' t,::11 f, 
contrn.ct \,'lttl lllL' ,,T)t11.:l 
contacts ;.,"i tli /,p!-JL l l,::.1:t 1 :__, ._, '..:: :_'Jr!:L'' !.- ., • ..._ j' I l 
to pay 11 SOJT1C:ti11n2' 11 or. thf .Ju\J,.!1.,cnt • '1\·l r· 
-4-
AJ>f'L'LLrnt's attorney and the Respondent resulted in an ad hoc 
1111.l,,rsLan<ling that the Appellant would begin making $20.00 per 
,,, 11 pdvments; and that, at some point in time, the Appellant 
, I 1 1 n· n·nse that monthly payment. The fact that Respondent 
'"- 1·1veJ these $20.00 per month payments is not an "acceptance" 
v. i r h the intent to cc 1 ntract as required by law to form a 
rrc:ct. l'lr. was elated to receive "any" type of 
f'dYlllent from the Appellant after he had received no payments for 
Almost five (5) vears. 
Even assuming that the Court finds that there has been an 
offer and an acceptance in the traditional sense of contract 
law, the alleged contract between the parties is not valid 
because it is not supported by the essential element of valuable 
consideration. The classical definition of consideration is as 
follows: 
"A valuable consideration in the sense of the law, 
may consist either in some right, profit, or benefit 
accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, 
loss or responsibility, given suffered or undertaken by 
the other." (Contract Law by Charles Knapp.) 
In the case at bar, the debt owed to Respondent was reduced 
to Judgment in May of 1975. The amount owed to the Respondent 
·" that time was $11 ,540.33. The Judgment became, and is today, 
d pre-existing obligation owed to the Respondent. 
cnunsel originally argued and represented to 
: ''" l ri,a c,ourt U1dt "in trns case the consideration is that the 
1·111111 l'laintifi U<espondent)". See Paragraph 4 of Page 4 
- 5-
of Defendant's (Appellant), tle111ura11d1m i11 S111•1»rl [(>; 
Enjoin Sheriff's Sale. N uv;, t) l' tu rt· l J l l' ,,·., 1 i l 'l' l J 1 L r 1 1 1 1 11 l 
Appellant's counsel is argul!l)', th,1t tl1e· «<>t1'I>i• '·" 1"11 
alleged contract shuulJ be thl' c1,1ct 1 '"'' ,,1 1·1 ,J '·"'." 
and/or that the Appellant hds rc:llvd UIK>J, :.nc 1u1d«t·,1,111•JJ11• 
the parties to her legal detr11•1cnl. :;c'l' i'.'i'c' '"" 
Appellant's Hrief. 
lt is a well established principal ::11"t t ne c1c1cLrinv llc 
estoppel mav be apolicJ, in c1•rL1in c.rs1·s, :1.<c 
substitute for consideration. Appellant's counsel cites 
Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (l'JbO), as a 
case illustrating this principal. Although this case has soc1c 
similarity to the facts of the present case, it has nu::'11ng tc1 
do with the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
Judge Durham detennined that the principal of accord an,: 
satisfaction ruled the outcome of the case not promissory 
estoppel. In Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, !1r. Anderson 
had incurred a different legal detriment as a result of 
satisfying the debt he owed to Sugarhouse lir. Ar1ut.:rSL 1 ;1 
had borrowed the money elsewhere to satisfy the debt, tnerc' 1 y 
detrimentally relying on the Vl!"ties' agrec"l<:'r.C:. 
"ln effect, defendant had agree,'i to transt"r the 
debt represented bv pLn nt1ff' s LL· ,, t 11ir 
party, thereby i'TI'l\eciiate>l·J n",JJ 
owed tu 'I• i .._ 1.·. 
had no legctl 0Ll1gdllu11 t .. '''·" t" 
could on 1 \' T":O\'(' [,'\' 1 t · 
already o;.;,ned by thl' dctcnd<Jnt l' 11"'1f• •,J 
legally rE::'quirl' cJefE·nd :n• tr !'! l' 1 
gations co satisfy the j h·: l: ; :: · 
-6-
POINT II 
THE CONTRACT, IF ANY, BET\ffEN TJIE l'Al'Tl/C; JS 
BARRED BY THE ST/\TllTE OF 
The Utah Code Annotute<!, Sec'.tiun IY'd, ,,, '"">I' 
states as follows: 
"In the fol lo\"'inr: C\' 1 ·:v 
unless such agreement, or srnne n,itc 
thereof, is in subscribed 
ct1drgeJ L11ert>\..l t:i 
f'llt '-;]) 111 1-,,, \'r>i(J 
,1r memi..)r,-1ndum 
tlw i«lrlv Lu be 
" ( 1) Every agreement by its tc·nns is nut to be 
performed within one year from the rn0king thereof." 
The Appellant argues t11at tne dlieut;ed cuntrc1ct is 
memorialized in the legal sense in the letter which tlr. Barrie 
Vernon sent to the Respondent on February 8, 1980, thereby 
satisfying the Statute of Frauds. 
It is obvious that a $20.00 per month payment on a Judgment 
in excess of $11,000.00 will not satisfy the same within one (1) 
year. Therefore, a writing or an acceptable memorandum of that 
agreement must be in writing. 
Mr. Vernon's letter of February 8, 1980 does not set forth 
or memorialize the terms or conditions of any contract. The 
only thing Mr. Vernon does do is to represent that the Appellant 
will be making $20.00 per month payments but, also, immediately 
begins to dispute the amount due pursuant tu the 1974 Promissory 
Note. That issue was detern1i!led by the Trial Court in thl' 
<lrir,i11.:-il r:...-:1sP v11j1'!1 }1 ,J,....,'-..t1rv !ti 
s1:.s,0.;;, ' r ' 
The let tPr is, a1 sr_1, nnt 
by it, namely the Appellant nor tlie kesfx>!ldent. s L rung ly uq',l' 
-8-
Lhe Court that a letter sent to a person by another's attorney 
,11fiµuting the amount owed, which, by the way, had already been 
, , ,Jii,·cd to judgment, and rehearsing events which allegedly 
.,. ,·11rreJ sC>vcral years prior, that this "writing" does not meet 
Lhte ciiLeria ui Sectiur1 131, Restatement (Second) on Contracts 
\ 1981) • 
i urtt1t>nnure, c:l1<c cuntt>nts Oi: U1e letter show no legal 
detriment to the Appellant as and for consideration to bind such 
an arrangement. 
Appellant cites Guinand v. Walton, 22 Utah 2d 196, 450 P.2d 
467 (1969), in support of the memorandum theory. The letter in 
that case was signed by the persons who were incurring a legal 
detriment. They were exchanging business assets to secure the 
employment from another person. The Appellant in the present 
case suffered no legal detriment. 
Appellant argues that the alleged oral contract was 
partially performed and therefore it should be taken out of the 
Statute of Frauds and made totally enforceable. Appellant cites 
Price vs. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P.2d 767 (1906) and Jensen v. 
Whitesides, 13 Utah 2d 193, 370 P.2d 765 (1963) in support of 
th2t acglil!lent. A careful reading of both of these cases 
indicated that the agrieved party in each case had fully 
fH'rfnr:'l0rl rhei r nf thP nr;i] ap,reement; ;rnrl as a result 
ll1L·ttvl, t11e ur<..1.i.. v ..ias e11£urced notwithstanding the 
11, cf Fr ·1·rlc.. I suggest to the Court that the proposition 
r 11.it cuntruls "hen partial perfunned oral agreements should be 
-9-
taken out of the Statute of Frauds is as folluws h11< n dll u r a J 
contract is not performable within one (1) Y<'ar and should lw in 
writing according to the applicable St<-Jtute ,,f l·r:n1d., :.i1'1 1 ii< 
oral agreement is fullv fJCrfo_rmed c;n nnc c:id1• I i><·I) h·· L 111 
weight of authority the Court mciy make the (JL1l C(J!lt ra <"I 
enforceable. The rationale being that this avuiJs li1L' lllJ uc:'. 
which would result if the par:y whc' haJ n•n·1ve<i the· ''ttlc:-, 
performance could use the Statute of Frauds to escdpe his ow11 
obligation. Dutton v. Interstate · ]Q 
Cal.2d 65, 199 P.2d 138 (1941). 
Therefore, partial performance of an oral contract not 
performable within one (1) year can only make enforceable that 
portion of the oral contract which has been performed. 
It is obvious that the Appellant, by paying $20.00 per 
month, would not pay off a Judgment of $11 ,540.33, plus the 
accruing interest at the legal rate, within one (1) year; and 
therefore, any agreement of this nature should have been in 
writing. Assuming that the Court finds an oral agreement 
existed, then only that portion of the agreement which has been 
performed is enforceable, 
POINT III 
THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IS !WT 
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR. 
Promissory estoppel is an equitable :•1.· '.i' 
imposed to prevent fraud, serious i nJ ur:: c '.- :;L"·'' 
injustice. Appellant cites .c.'._l_itsos :-i 
-1 0-
, I K l'. id 1 L9 ( 1966) as a case evolving the doctrine of 
rr<>1111ss0ry estoppel. In that case, an agreement had been 
H'h<d hetween the parties whereby the plaintiff did not 
l<>se on the mechanic's lien which he held in reliance upon 
Ll•l' dl'lencJanL's promise to pay the $681.46 debt. The defendant 
11evc:r paid the debt and the six (6) month statute time limit 
expired in which to foreclose on the lien. The oefendant then 
denied any liability on the debt. The Court helci that the 
ckfendant was estopped from denying the liability and may be 
sued in a personal action regardless of the fact that the time 
for foreclosing on the lien had expired. 
The Court determined that Kadish's forbearance of not 
foreclosing on the lien may not have had "consideration" in the 
traditional sense, "but he certainly forebore in reliance upon 
Appellants promise to pay". Glitsos v. Kadish, p. 132. 
Furthermore, Kadish would have been substantially injured as a 
result of that forbearance if the Court allowed Glitsos to deny 
his liability. 
The Appellant has not, in these proceedings, forborne or 
suffered any legal or equitable injury to the rights or 
she may have, or had, as a result of paying $20.00 per 
mnnth on the Judgment. Nor has she suffered any injustice as a 
of the Respondent patiently accepting only $20.00 per 
.•1unth as payment on a Judgment of $11,540.33, plus interest at 
tlie le,;al rc1tc, uver a three (3) year period of time. The legal 
-11-
interest alone on the Judgment and compounded 111tt·rest, 1s 
currently accruing at $125.00 per month. 
The Court would be creating iJ manifcsl 1111w;! 1c·<· l<>r ll1< 
Responde<t if it the Appellant tu cu11t111u,· indi' th,· 
$20.00 month payments on the Judgment 
cor;cLUSION 
ln SUllll•iJry, ll is tne kespondent's position that 111 the 
absence .Jf any offer, acceptance or cunsiderat ion that there is 
no valid contract between him and the Appellant. Any payment 
the Appellant has made to Respondent should not be deemed to be 
"consideration" for the creation of any new contract because the 
Appellant is only paying on a pre-existing duty which was 
created when a Judgment was rendered against the Appellant in 
llay of 1975. 
The alleged contract was, and is, non-performable within 
one (1) year and is required to be in writing according to 
Section 25-5-4, Utah Code Annotated. In order for Appellant to 
have the oral agreement, if any, taken out of the Statute of 
Frauds, she must allege and pruve that she has fully perfonned 
her part of the agreement, which Appellant has not done. 
Partial perfonn;rnce is not sufficient to take the entire 
contract out of the Statute of Frauds. 
The Annellant has suffered no legal detriment at all as a 
rL0u.1..t o: tJic :_11dt tnc has bef'n cxtreml!ly 
patient 1n accept1np her small munthlv payments prior tu 
If tt1e Court did c;l low thP ad 
-1 2-
\1,q' 1n1d.,rstanding to continue, the Judgment and the accruing 
,,,r, tt'Sl would never be paid and the Appellant would be making 
1 11il >'"r P1onLh payment in perpetuity. 
Jhc,retore, the Respondent prays that the Court uphold the 
,J,,,,1s1on of the Trial Court in favor of the Respondent by 
rcmdnding the matter to the 1hird District Court in and for 
'Ju,Jt:le County, and thereby allowing the Respondent the right to 
on his Judgment. 
submitted this 8th day of July, 1983. 
D • WHITE 
Attorn for Plaintiff-Respondent 
Prudential Plaza 
185 North Main Street, Suite B-1 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
-13-
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
'" r ,.J,y certify that two (2) copies of this Brief were 
11·d to Barrie A. Vernon, Attorney for Defendant-
South tlain Street, Tooele, Utah, on this 8th day 
1 Ii\'. 1 '<R J. 
__LJ v._ ), 14:--3 f:: "-->0 
DOL.G S t£ WHITE 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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EXH 1 Bl T 1 
ALLMENT PROMISSORY NOTl 
Tooele City. . ui.,October 12 . 19 74 
colly P'Om•tO lo ray 10 the ord•r of 
WILLIAM COCHIS .. 
Tooele 
.. Utah or al hich o•h•r pl•(• •• .... ltellllef h..-... 
. Hundred 
"'' ,,,., 0 mor Nine Thousand Eight DOll•RS 119,800.00 
1·.iiJ in full tlovember 12, 1974 
('' 
,, ..... xx 
NA 
,,, 011 ..,,,., 1 !i ,., 0 , po·d '" full ... ,thin 10 doy1 olt•r th du• dr:il•. o chorgo 111oy b• 011e1Hd of S .......• Or ol hollll.,'1 •l•rl••"· 0111 •••••I 
1 
,, P•"•nloQ• 101• 1lol•d obowo l1111e1 lhe vripoid omourll of Iha uuloll"'ertl l101t1 th• d.,e dole ol th1 •fltlolhnent 41111111 poilf f111 fwll. 
,,,,•old•< dH"'' lhell ''"•tufO 01 ol default b. mode lt1 poymonl In ... hole or '" porl of OflY lrulaOnieftl al the ti""• wh111 or tho ploca ••••• 1•0 •••• 
', •, oovobl• 01 olo•e1o•d lhel'I the en lire .. npold bolon(e, 1holl, ol lhe el"<l•On of lhe holder hereof ond w1lho111 nol•C. •f 104olll e!.cho•. •I 9f11oC9 
fl
1
·
1
:
1 
or·d poyoble 111 •••l'lf ol ony '"ch dcfowll o.' occelcrnlion, tho wnd<'o•gncd, joinlly 011d te••rolly, OU'•• to .poy to the. hol .. ., hereof , ....... ..... 
1 tu ond lowlul <oll•clto" colll 1n oddoloon to all 01h., 111tr11 du• h•r•under. Any bolono ut1po1d Oft "'Dlunty ol thi1 IKI .. tAoll .... 1111, lti,JO ••P•lll 
r' ,,.,olt•r. 1:.olh b1:1lor• ond oll•t judgment, ot the orir'lllol P•"""''oo• rot• llol<'d obo••. 
,. 1110 ..,d, pro••••. nol•l• cl d11hol'lor Oftd ••len1iot1 ol l•m• ... 11ho"t nol•(• or• her•by ..,a•••d orid lhe wl'ld•,.•gnt' con1e111t 90 lh• ,...._ .. er ••J 
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